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Abstract
The Plutus file system introduced the notion of key rotation as a means to derive a sequence
of temporally-related keys from the most recent key. In this paper we show that, despite natural
intuition to the contrary, key rotation schemes cannot generically be used to key other crypto-
graphic objects; in fact, keying an encryption scheme with the output of a key rotation scheme
can yield a composite system that is insecure. To address these shortcomings, we introduce a
new cryptographic object called a key regression scheme, and we propose three constructions
that are provably secure under standard cryptographic assumptions. We implement key regres-
sion in a secure file system and empirically show that key regression can significantly reduce
the bandwidth requirements of a content publisher under realistic workloads using lazy revoca-
tion. Our experiments also serve as the first empirical evaluation of either a key rotation or key
regression scheme.
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1 Introduction
Content distribution networks (CDNs) such as Akamai [3], BitTorrent [15], and Coral [21] enable
content publishers with low-bandwidth connections to make single-writer, many-reader content
available at high throughput. When a CDN is untrusted and the content publisher cannot rely
on the network to enforce proper access control, the content publisher can achieve access control
by encrypting the content and distributing the cryptographic keys to legitimate users [23, 26, 31,
33, 40, 43]. Under the lazy revocation model for access control [23, 33], following the eviction
of a user from the set of members, the content publisher will encrypt future content with a new
cryptographic key and will, upon request, distribute that new key to all remaining and future
members. The content publisher does not immediately re-encrypt all pre-existing content since the
evicted member could have already cached that content.
The content publisher can use the CDN to distribute the encrypted content, but without the
aid of a trusted server, the content publisher must distribute all the cryptographic keys to mem-
bers directly. To prevent the publisher’s connection from becoming a bottleneck, the Plutus file
system [33] introduced a new cryptographic object called a key rotation scheme. Plutus uses the
symmetric key Ki to encrypt content during the i-th time period, e.g., before the i-th eviction. If
a user becomes a member during the i-th time period, then Plutus gives that member the i-th key
Ki. From [33], the critical properties of a key rotation scheme are that given the i-th key Ki it
is (1) easy to compute the keys Kj for all previous time periods j < i, but (2) computationally
infeasible to compute the keys Kl for future time periods l > i. Property (1) enables the content
publisher to transfer only a single small key Ki to new members wishing to access all current and
past content, rather than the potentially large set of keys {K1,K2, . . . ,Ki}; this property reduces
the bandwidth requirements on the content publisher. Property (2) is intended to prevent a mem-
ber evicted during the i-th time period from accessing (learning the contents of) content encrypted
during the l-th time period, l > i.
1.1 Overview of contributions
In this work we uncover a design flaw with the definition of a key rotation scheme. To address
the deficiencies with key rotation, we introduce a new cryptographic object called a key regression
scheme. We present RSA-based, SHA1-based, and AES-based key regression schemes. We imple-
ment and analyze the performance of key regression in the context of a secure file system. The
following paragraphs summarize our contributions in more detail.
Negative results on key rotation. We begin by presenting a design flaw with the definition
of key rotation: for any realistic key rotation scheme, even though a member evicted during the
i-th time period cannot predict (except with negligible probability) subsequent keys Kl, l > i, the
evicted member can distinguish subsequent keys Kl from random. The lack of pseudorandomness
follows from the fact that if an evicted member is given the real key Kl, then by definition (i.e.,
by property (1)) the evicted member can recover the real key Ki; but given a random key instead
of Kl, the evicted member will with high probability recover a key K
′
i 6= Ki. The difference
between unpredictability and lack of pseudorandomness can have severe consequences in practice.
To illustrate the seriousness of this design flaw, we describe a key rotation scheme and a symmetric
encryption scheme that individually meet their desired security properties (property (2) for key
rotation and IND-CPA privacy for symmetric encryption [7]), but when combined (e.g., when a
content publisher uses the keys from the key rotation scheme to key the symmetric encryption
3
              
             
  

    

    

 
	 
  
	 
  


	 
  
	 
  


	 
  
	 
  


	 
  
Figure 1: Key regression overview; stpi and stmi respectively represent the i-th publisher and
member states.
scheme) result in a system that fails to provide even a weak form of privacy.1
Fixing key rotation with key regression. While the above counter example does not imply
that all systems employing key rotation will fail just as drastically, it does motivate finding a
key rotation-like object that still achieves property (1) (or something similar) but (property (2′))
produces future keys that are pseudorandom to evicted members (as opposed to just unpredictable).
Assuming the new object achieves pseudorandomness, one could use it as a black box to key other
cryptographic constructs without worrying about the resulting system failing as drastically as the
one described above. A key regression scheme is such a key rotation-like object.
To describe key regression, we must enact a paradigm shift: rather than give a new member the
i-th key Ki directly, the content publisher would give the member a member state stmi. From the
member state, the member could derive the encryption key Ki for the i-th time period, as well as all
previous member states stmj, j < i. By transitivity, a member given the i-th member state could
also derive all previous keys Kj. By separating the member states from the keys, we can build key
regression schemes where the keys Kl, l > i, are pseudorandom to evicted members possessing only
the i-th member state stmi. Intuitively, the trick that we use in our constructions to make the keys
Kl pseudorandom is to ensure that given both Kl and stmi, it is still computationally infeasible for
the evicted member to compute the l-th member state stml. Viewed another way, there is no path
from Kl to stmi in Figure 1 and vice-versa.
Our constructions. We refer to our three preferred key regression schemes as KR-RSA, KR-SHA1,
and KR-AES. Rather than rely solely on potentially error-prone heuristic methods for analyzing
the security of our constructions, we prove under reasonable assumptions that all three are secure
key regression schemes. Our security proofs use the reduction-based provable security approach
pioneered by Goldwasser and Micali [28] and lifted to the concrete setting by Bellare, Kilian, and
Rogaway [8]. For KR-RSA, our proof is based on the assumption that RSA is one-way. For the
proof of both KR-RSA and KR-SHA1, we assume that SHA1 is a random oracle [9]. For the proof
of KR-AES, we assume that AES is a secure pseudorandom permutation [8, 36].
Implementation and evaluation. We integrated key regression into a secure file system to mea-
sure the performance characteristics of key regression in a real application. Our measurements show
that key regression can significantly reduce the bandwidth requirements of a publisher distributing
1We stress that the novelty here is in identifying the design flaw with key rotation, not in presenting a specific
counter example. Indeed, the counter example follows naturally from our observation that a key rotation scheme
does not produce pseudorandom keys.
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decryption keys to members. On a simulated cable modem, a publisher using key regression can
distribute 1 000 keys to 181 clients/sec whereas without key regression the cable modem limits the
publisher to 20 clients/sec. The significant gain in throughput conservation comes at no observable
cost to client latency, even though key regression requires more client-side computation. Our mea-
surements show that key regression actually reduces client latency in cases of highly dynamic group
membership. Our study represents the first empirical measurements of either a key regression or
key rotation scheme.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, on our testbed we find that KR-AES can perform more
than four times as many unwinds/sec than KR-SHA1. Our measurements can assist developers
in selecting the most appropriate key regression scheme for particular applications.
Applications. Key regression benefits publishers of popular content who have limited bandwidth
to their trusted servers, or who may not always be online, but who can use an untrusted CDN to
distribute encrypted content at high throughput. Our experimental results show that a publisher
using key regression on a low-bandwidth connection can serve more clients than the strawman ap-
proach of having the publisher distribute all keys {K1,K2, . . . ,Ki} directly to members. Moreover,
our experimental results suggest that key regression can be significantly better than the strawman
approach when i is large, as might be the case if the publisher has a high membership turnover
rate. Such a publisher might be an individual, a startup, or a cooperative with popular content
but with few network resources. The possibilities for such content range from blogs and amateur
press to operating systems and various forms of multimedia. To elaborate on one such form of
content, operating systems, Mandriva Linux currently uses the BitTorrent CDN to distribute its
latest Linux distributions to its Mandriva Club members [38]. Mandriva controls access to these
distributions by only releasing the .torrent files to its members. Using key regression and encryp-
tion for access control, Mandriva could exercise finer-grained access control over its distributions,
allowing members through time period i to access all versions of the operating system including
patches, minor revisions and new applications added through time period i, but no additions to
the operating system after the i-th time period.2
Versions. An extended abstract of this paper appears in the proceedings of the 2006 ISOC Network
and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS) [25]. This is the full version, a copy of which is
available at the IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive as report 2005/303 (http://eprint.iacr.org/).
Part of this work also appears as Chapter 4 of [23].
1.2 Related work
The key rotation scheme in Plutus [33] inspired our research in key regression. Bellare and Yee [11]
introduce the notion of a forward-secure pseudorandom bit generator (FSPRG). One can roughly
view forward-secure pseudorandom bit generation as the mirror image of key regression. Whereas
a key regression scheme is designed to prevent an evicted member in possession of stmi from
distinguishing subsequent encryption keys Kl, l > i, from random, a FSPRG is designed to prevent
an adversary who learns the state of the FSPRG at some point in time from distinguishing previous
outputs of the FSPRG from random. In our security proof for KR-AES, we make the relationship
between key regression and FSPRGs concrete by first proving that one can build a secure key
regression scheme from any secure FSPRG by essentially running the FSPRG backwards. Abdalla
2While Mandriva may wish to exercise access control over non-security-critical patches and upgrades, Mandriva
would likely wish to allow all Mandriva users, including evicted Mandriva Club members, access to all security-critical
patches. To enable such access, Mandriva could encrypt all security-critical patches with the key for the time period
to which the patch is first applicable, or Mandriva could simply not encrypt security-critical patches.
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and Bellare formally analyze methods for rekeying symmetric encryption schemes [1], and one of
their constructions is a FSPRG.
As pointed out by Boneh et al. [14], one possible mechanism for distributing updated content
encryption keys for a secure file system is to use a broadcast encryption scheme [18, 19, 20, 41].
Indeed, one of the main challenges faced by an encrypted file system is the distribution of the
encryption keys to the remaining (not evicted) set of users, and broadcast encryption provides
an ideal solution. We note, however, that key distribution is orthogonal to the specific problem
addressed by key regression; a key regression scheme is a key generation algorithm as opposed to
a key distribution algorithm. Key regression simply assumes the existence of a secure distribution
channel, of which broadcast encryption is one possible instantiation. Self-healing key distribution
with revocation [51] protocols are resilient even when broadcasts are lost on the network. One can
view key regression as having the self-healing property in perpetuity.
In concurrent work, and also motivated by the key rotation scheme in Plutus [33], Backes,
Cachin, and Oprea formalize the notion of key-updating for lazy revocation schemes [6] and con-
sider the composition of key-updating for lazy revocation schemes with other cryptographic ob-
jects [5]. The notion of a key-updating for lazy revocation scheme in [6] is essentially identical to
our notion of a key regression scheme. Using our parlance, in [6] they also propose several ways
of building key regression schemes; one of their proposals is identical to our KR-PRG construction
(Construction 7.3), and another proposal is a natural extension of our construction KR-RSA-RO
(Construction 10.1). Although we remark on the existence of a tree-based key regression scheme in
Section 5, [6] take the idea of a tree-based key regression scheme further by formally defining and
proving the security of a slightly different tree-based construction. In [6] the authors also observe
that one can use the keys output by a key regression scheme as the randomness source for the setup
algorithm of a (possibly different) key regression scheme; this observation enables the composition
of multiple key regression schemes.
2 Notation
If x and y are strings, then |x| denotes the length of x in bits and x‖y denotes their concatenation.
If x and y are two variables, we use x← y to denote the assignment of the value of y to x. If Y is
a set, we denote the selection of a random element in Y and its assignment to x as x
$
← Y . If f is
a deterministic (resp., randomized) function, then x← f(y) (resp., x
$
← f(y)) denotes the process
of running f on input y and assigning the result to x. We use the special symbol ⊥ to denote an
error.
We use AESK(M) to denote the process of running the AES block cipher with key K on input
block M . We use SHA1(M) to denote the process of running the SHA1 hash function on input
M . An RSA [44] key generator for some security parameter k is a randomized algorithm Krsa that
returns a triple (N, e, d). Since our analyses are in the concrete setting, we write (N, e, d)
$
← Krsa
rather than (N, e, d)
$
← Krsa(k). The modulus N is the product of two distinct odd primes p, q such
that 2k−1 ≤ N < 2k; the encryption exponent e ∈ Z∗
ϕ(N) and the decryption exponent d ∈ Z
∗
ϕ(N)
are such that ed ≡ 1 mod ϕ(N), where ϕ(N) = (p− 1)(q − 1). Section 10 describes what it means
for an RSA key generator to be one-way.
3 Problems with key rotation
A key rotation scheme [33] consists of three algorithms: setup, wndkey, and unwndkey. Figure 2
shows the original (RSA-based) Plutus key rotation scheme [33]. Following Plutus, and as Naor,
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Alg. setup
(N, e, d)
$
← Krsa ; K
$
← Z∗N
pk← 〈N, e〉 ; sk← 〈K,N, d〉
Return (pk, sk)
Alg. wndkey(sk = 〈K,N, d〉)
K ′ ← Kd mod N
sk′ ← 〈K ′, N, d〉
Return (K, sk′)
Alg. unwndkey(K, pk = 〈N, e〉)
Return Ke mod N
Figure 2: The Plutus key rotation scheme; Krsa is an RSA key generator.
Alg. setup
KMW
$
← {0, 1}160 ; pk← ε
For i = MW downto 2 do
Ki−1 ← SHA1(Ki)
sk← 〈1,K1, . . . ,KMW〉
Return (pk, sk)
Alg. wndkey(sk = 〈i,K1, . . . ,KMW〉)
If i > MW return (⊥, sk)
sk′ ← 〈i+ 1,K1, . . . ,KMW〉
Return (Ki, sk
′)
Alg. unwndkey(K, pk)
// ignore pk
K ′ ← SHA1(K)
Return K ′
Figure 3: A hash chain-based key rotation scheme.
Shenhav, and Wool also observe [42], one familiar with hash chains [35] and S/KEY [30] might
design the key rotation scheme in Figure 3. Such a scheme is more efficient than the scheme in
Figure 2, but is limited because it can only produce MW (“max wind”) keys, where MW is a
parameter chosen by the implementor or at configuration time. A content publisher runs the setup
algorithm to initialize a key rotation scheme; the result is public information pk for all users and a
secret sk1 for the content publisher. The content publisher invokes wndkey(ski) to obtain the key
Ki and a new secret ski+1. Any user in possession of Ki, i > 1, and pk can invoke unwndkey(Ki, pk)
to obtain Ki−1. Informally, the desired security property of a key rotation scheme is that, given
only Ki and pk, it should be computationally infeasible for an evicted member (the adversary) to
compute Kl, for any l > i. The Plutus construction in Figure 2 has this property under the RSA
one-wayness assumption (defined in Section 10), and the construction in Figure 3 has this property
if one replaces SHA1 with a random oracle [9].
The problem. In Section 1 we observed that the l-th key output by a key rotation scheme cannot
be pseudorandom, i.e., will be distinguishable from a random string, to an ex-member in possession
of the key Ki for some previous time period i < l.
3 We consider the following example to emphasize
how this lack of pseudorandomness might impact the security of a real system that combines a key
rotation scheme and a symmetric encryption scheme as a black box.
For our example, we first present a key rotation scheme KO and an encryption scheme SE that
individually satisfy their respective security goals (unpredictability for the key rotation scheme
and IND-CPA privacy [7] for the symmetric encryption scheme). To build KO, we start with a
secure key rotation scheme KO; KO outputs keys twice as long as KO. The KO winding algorithm
wndkey invokes KO’s winding algorithm to obtain a key K; wndkey then returns K‖K as its key.
On input a key K‖K, unwndkey invokes KO’s unwinding algorithm with input K to obtain a
3Technically, there may be pathological examples where the l-th key is pseudorandom to a member given the i-th
key, but these examples seem to have other problems of their own. For example, consider a key rotation scheme
like the one in Figure 3, but where SHA1 is replaced with a function mapping all inputs to some constant string
C, e.g., the all 0 key. Now set MW = 2, i = 1, and l = 2. In this pathological example K2 is clearly random
to the evicted member, meaning (better than) pseudorandom. But this construction still clearly lacks our desired
pseudorandomness property since the key K1 is always the constant string C.
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key K ′; unwndkey then returns K ′‖K ′ as its key. If the keys output by wndkey are unpredictable
to evicted members, then so must be the keys output by wndkey. To build SE , we start with
a secure symmetric encryption scheme SE ; SE uses keys that are twice as long as SE . The SE
encryption and decryption algorithms take the key K, split it into two halves K = L1‖L2, and run
the respective algorithms of SE with key L1⊕L2. If the key K is random, then the key L1⊕L2
is random and SE runs the SE encryption algorithm with a uniformly selected random key. This
means that SE satisfies the standard IND-CPA security goal if SE does.
Despite the individual security of both KO and SE , when the keys output by KO are used to
key SE , SE will always run SE with the all-zero key; i.e., the content publisher will encrypt all
content under the same constant key. An adversary can thus trivially compromise the privacy of all
encrypted data, including data encrypted during time periods l > i after being evicted. Although
the construction of KO and SE may seem somewhat contrived (though we hope less contrived than
some other possible counter examples), this example shows that combining a key rotation scheme
and an encryption scheme may have undesirable consequences and, therefore, that it is not wise to
use (even a secure) key rotation scheme as a black box to directly key other cryptographic objects.
4 Key Regression
The negative result in Section 3 motivates our quest to find a new cryptographic object, similar
to key rotation, but for which the keys generated at time periods l > i are pseudorandom to
any adversary evicted at time i. Here we formalize such an object: a key regression scheme.
Following the reduction-based practice-oriented provable security approach [8, 28], our formalisms
involve carefully defining the syntax, correctness requirements, and security goal of a key regression
scheme. These formalisms enable us to, in Sections 8–10, prove that our preferred constructions
are secure under reasonable assumptions. We desire provable security over solely ad hoc analyses
since, under ad hoc methods alone, one can never be completely convinced that a cryptographic
construction is secure even if one assumes that the underlying components (e.g., block ciphers, hash
functions, RSA) are secure.
Overview of key regression. Figure 1 gives an abstract overview of a key regression scheme.
The content publisher has content publisher states stpi from which it derives future publisher and
member states. When using a key regression scheme, instead of giving a new member the i-th key
Ki, the content publisher would give the member the i-th member state stmi. As the arrows in
Figure 1 suggest, given stmi, a member can efficiently compute all previous member states and the
keys K1, . . . ,Ki. Although it would be possible for an ex-member to distinguish future member
states stml, l > i, from random (the ex-member would extend our observation on the lack of
pseudorandomness in key rotation schemes), because there is no efficient path between the future
keys Kl and the ex-member’s last member state stmi, it is possible for a key regression scheme to
produce future keys Kl that are pseudorandom (indistinguishable from random). We present some
such constructions in Section 5.
On an alternative: Use key rotation carefully. Figure 1 might suggest an alternative approach
for fixing the problems with key rotation. Instead of using the keys Ki from a key rotation scheme
to directly key other cryptographic objects, use a function of Ki, like SHA1(Ki), instead. If one
models SHA1 as a random oracle and if the key rotation scheme produces unpredictable future
keys Kl, then it might seem reasonable to conclude that an ex-member given Ki should not be
able to distinguish future values SHA1(Kl), l > i, from random. While this reasoning may be
sound for some specific key rotation schemes (this reasoning actually serves as the basis for our
derivative of the construction in Figure 2, KR-RSA in Construction 5.3) we dislike this approach
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for several reasons. First, we believe that it is unreasonable to assume that every engineer will
know to or remember to use the hash function. Further, even if the engineer knew to hash the
keys, the engineer might not realize that simply computing SHA1(Kl) may not work with all key
rotation schemes, which means that the engineer cannot use a key rotation scheme as a black box.
For example, while SHA1(Kl) would work for the scheme in Figure 2, it would cause problems
for the scheme in Figure 3. We choose to consider a new cryptographic object, key regression,
because we desire a cryptographic object that is not as prone to accidental misuse. Additionally,
by focusing attention on a new cryptographic object, we allow ourselves greater flexibility in how
we construct objects that meet our requirements. For example, one of our preferred constructions
(KR-AES, Construction 5.2) does not use a hash function and is therefore secure in the standard
model instead of the random oracle model; see also KR-FSPRG (Construction 6.1) and KR-PRG
(Construction 7.3).
4.1 Syntax and correctness requirements
Syntax. Here we formally define the syntax of a key regression scheme KR = (setup,wind, unwind,
keyder). Let H be a random oracle; for notational consistency, all four algorithms are given access
to the random oracle, though the algorithms for some constructions may not use the random oracle
in their computations. Via stp
$
← setupH , the randomized setup algorithm returns a publisher state.
Via (stp′, stm)
$
← windH(stp), the randomized winding algorithm takes a publisher state stp and
returns a pair of publisher and member states or the error code (⊥,⊥). Via stm′ ← unwindH(stm)
the deterministic unwinding algorithm takes a member state stm and returns a member state or
the error code ⊥. Via K ← keyderH(stm) the deterministic key derivation algorithm takes a
member state stm and returns a key K ∈ DK, where DK is the derived key space for KR. Let
MW ∈ {1, 2, . . .} ∪ {∞} denote the maximum number of derived keys that KR is designed to
produce. We do not define the behavior of the algorithms when input the error code ⊥.
Correctness. Our first correctness criterion for a key regression scheme is that the first MW times
that wind is invoked, it always outputs valid member states, i.e., the outputs are never ⊥. Our
second correctness requirement ensures that if stmi is the i-th member state output by wind, and
if i > 1, then from stmi, one can derive all previous member states stmj, 0 < j < i. Formally, let
stp0
$
← setup and, for i = 1, 2, . . ., let (stpi, stmi)
$
← windH(stpi−1). For each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,MW}, we
require that stmi 6= ⊥ and that, for i ≥ 2, unwind
H(stmi) = stmi−1.
Remarks. Although we allow wind to be randomized, the wind algorithms in all of our construc-
tions are deterministic. We allow wind to return (⊥,⊥) since we only require that wind return
non-error states for its first MW invocations. We use the pair (⊥,⊥), rather than simply ⊥, to
denote an error from wind since doing so makes our pseudocode cleaner. We allow unwind to
return ⊥ since the behavior of unwind may be undefined when input the first member state. A
construction may use multiple random oracles, but since one can always obtain multiple random
oracles from a single random oracle [9], our definitions assume just one. It is straightforward to
modify our syntax, correctness requirements, and (subsequent) security definition to accommodate
key regression schemes for which the random oracle depends on the output of setup. We stress that
MW is a correctness parameter of KR, not a security parameter, meaning that even though the
correctness criteria must hold for MW invocations of wind, the security goal may not. One can also
further generalize our definition and allow unwind and keyder to be randomized, though we do not
envision such constructions in practice.
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4.2 Security goal
For security, we desire that if a member (adversary) is evicted during the i-th time period, then
the adversary will not be able to distinguish the keys derived from any subsequent member state
stml, l > i, from randomly selected keys. Definition 4.1 captures this goal as follows. We allow the
adversary to obtain as many member states as it wishes (via a WindO oracle). The WindO oracle
returns only a member state rather than both a member and publisher state. Once the adversary is
evicted, its goal is to break the pseudorandomness of subsequently derived keys. To model this, we
allow the adversary to query a key derivation oracle KeyderO. The key derivation oracle will either
return real derived keys (via internal calls to wind and keyder) or random keys. The adversary’s
goal is to guess whether the KeyderO oracle’s responses are real derived keys or random keys.
Definition 4.1 [Security for key regression schemes.] Let KR = (setup,wind, unwind, keyder)
be a key regression scheme. Let A be an adversary. Consider the experiments Expkr-bKR,A, b ∈ {0, 1},
and the oracles WindO and KeyderOb below. The adversary runs in two stages, member and
non-member, and returns a bit.
Experiment Expkr-bKR,A
Pick random oracle H
i← 0
stp
$
← setupH
st
$
← AWindO,H(member)
b′
$
← AKeyderOb,H(non-member, st)
Return b′
Oracle WindO
i← i+ 1
If i > MW then
return ⊥
(stp, stm)
$
← windH(stp)
Return stm
Oracle KeyderOb
i← i+ 1
If i > MW then return ⊥
(stp, stm)
$
← windH(stp)
If b = 1 then
K ← keyderH(stm)
If b = 0 then
K
$
← DK
Return K
The KR-advantage of A in breaking the security of KR is defined as
AdvkrKR,A = Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,A = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expkr-0KR,A = 1
]
.
Under the concrete security approach [8], we say that KR is KR-secure if for any adversary A
attacking KR with resources (running time, size of code, number of oracle queries) limited to
“practical” amounts, the KR-advantage of A is “small.”
Remarks. Since the publisher is in charge of winding and is not supposed to invoke the winding
algorithm more than the prescribed maximum number of times, MW, the WindO and KeyderO
oracles in our security definition only respond to the first MW queries from the adversary. Alter-
natively, we could remove the conditional check for i > MW in the pseudocode for WindO and
KeyderO and instead ask that the underlying wind algorithm behave appropriately if invoked more
than MW times, e.g., by maintaining the counter internally. Since a key regression scheme will
have multiple recipients of member keys, we must consider coalitions of adversaries; i.e., can two
or more adversaries collude to obtain additional information? Because of the property that given
any member state one can derive all previous member states, multiple colluding adversaries cannot
obtain more information than a single adversary who makes the most WindO and KeyderO oracle
queries. In addition to desiring that future derived keys be pseudorandom to evicted members, we
desire that all the derived keys be pseudorandom to adversaries that are never members. If a key
regression scheme is secure under Definition 4.1, then the key regression scheme also satisfies this
weaker security goal since one can view adversaries that are never members as adversaries that make
zero WindO oracle queries. Unlike with key rotation schemes (Section 3), the pseudorandomness
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KR-SHA1 KR-AES KR-RSA
MW =∞ No No Yes
Random oracles Yes No Yes
setup cost MW SHA1 ops MW AES ops 1 RSA key generation
wind cost no crypto no crypto 1 RSA decryption
unwind cost 1 SHA1 op 1 AES op 1 RSA encryption
keyder cost 1 SHA1 op 1 AES op 1 SHA1 op
Table 1: Our preferred constructions. There are ways of implementing these constructions with
different wind costs. The “random oracles” line refers to whether our security proof is in the random
oracle model or not.
of future keys means that a content publisher can use the keys output by a secure key regression
scheme to key other cryptographic objects like symmetric encryption schemes [7] and MACs [8];
as [1, 11] do for rekeying schemes and FSPRGs, [5] makes this reasoning formal for key regression
schemes.
5 Our preferred constructions
We are now in a position to describe our three preferred key regression schemes, KR-SHA1, KR-AES
and KR-RSA. Table 1 summarizes some of their main properties. KR-SHA1 is a derivative of the
key rotation scheme in Figure 3 and KR-RSA is a derivative of the Plutus key rotation scheme in
Figure 2. The primary differences between the new key regression schemes KR-SHA1 and KR-RSA
and the original key rotation schemes are the addition of the new, SHA1-based keyder algorithms
and the adjusting of terminology (e.g., member states in these key regression schemes correspond
to keys in the original key rotation schemes). KR-AES is new but is based on one of Bellare and
Yee’s forward-secure pseudorandom bit generators (FSPRGs) [11].
5.1 The KR-SHA1 construction
Construction 5.1 details our KR-SHA1 construction. In the construction of KR-SHA1, we prepend
the string 08 to the input to SHA1 in keyder to ensure that the inputs to SHA1 never collide between
the keyder and unwind algorithms; note that the stm variable always denotes a 160-bit string.
Construction 5.1 [KR-SHA1.] The key regression scheme KR-SHA1 = (setup,wind, unwind, keyder)
is defined as follows. MW is a positive integer and a parameter of the construction.
Alg. setup
stmMW
$
← {0, 1}160
For i = MW downto 2 do
stmi−1 ← unwind(stmi)
stp← 〈1, stm1, . . . , stmMW〉
Return stp
Alg. wind(stp)
If stp = ⊥ then return (⊥,⊥)
Parse stp as 〈i, stm1, . . . , stmMW〉
If i > MW return (⊥,⊥)
stp′ ← 〈i+ 1, stm1, . . . , stmMW〉
Return (stp′, stmi)
Alg. unwind(stm)
stm′ ← SHA1(stm)
Return stm′
Alg. keyder(stm)
K ← SHA1(08‖stm)
Return K
The derived key space for KR-SHA1 is DK = {0, 1}160 .
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In practice we assume that the MW might be some reasonable value like 220. We give a proof of
security for KR-SHA1 in Section 9. In our proof of security we view the application of SHA1(·)
in unwind as one random oracle and the application of SHA1(08‖·) in keyder as another random
oracle. The proof of security for KR-SHA1 is thus in the random oracle model [9].
5.2 The KR-AES construction
Our next preferred construction, KR-AES, uses the AES block cipher and is provably secure in the
standard model, meaning without random oracles but assuming that AES is a secure pseudorandom
permutation [8, 36].
Construction 5.2 [KR-AES.] The key regression scheme KR-AES = (setup,wind, unwind, keyder)
is defined as follows. MW is a positive integer and a parameter of the construction.
Alg. setup
stmMW
$
← {0, 1}128
For i = MW downto 2 do
stmi−1 ← unwind(stmi)
stp← 〈1, stm1, . . . , stmMW〉
Return stp
Alg. wind(stp)
If stp = ⊥ then return (⊥,⊥)
Parse stp as 〈i, stm1, . . . , stmMW〉
If i > MW return (⊥,⊥)
stp′ ← 〈i+ 1, stm1, . . . , stmMW〉
Return (stp′, stmi)
Alg. unwind(stm)
stm′ ← AESstm(0
128)
Return stm′
Alg. keyder(stm)
K ← AESstm(1
128)
Return K
The derived key space for KR-AES is DK = {0, 1}128.
As with KR-SHA1, we assume that the MW might be some reasonable value like 220. We prove the
security of KR-AES in stages. We first show how to build a secure key regression scheme from any
forward-secure pseudorandom bit generator (FSPRG) [11]; we call our construction KR-FSPRG.
We then recall one of Bellare and Yee’s [11] methods (FSPRG-PRG) for building secure FSPRGs
from standard pseudorandom bit generators (PRGs) [11, 12, 54]. Instantiating KR-FSPRG with
FSPRG-PRG yields a secure PRG-based key regression scheme that we call KR-PRG. KR-AES
is then an instantiation of KR-PRG with a PRG that, on input a 128-bit string stm, outputs
AESstm(0
128)‖AESstm(1
128). Since the constructions KR-FSPRG and KR-PRG have multiple possible
instantiations, we consider them to be of independent interest. Details in Sections 6 through 8.
Remark. On can also view KR-SHA1 as an instantiation of KR-PRG with a PRG (in the random
oracle model) that, on input a string stm ∈ {0, 1}160, outputs SHA1(stm)‖SHA1(08‖stm). In
Section 9 we prove KR-SHA1 directly, rather than by instantiating KR-PRG, in order to obtain
tighter bounds.
5.3 The KR-RSA construction
Our final preferred construction, KR-RSA derives from the key rotation scheme in Figure 2. KR-RSA
differs from KR-SHA1 and KR-AES in that MW =∞, meaning that a content provider can invoke
the KR-RSA winding algorithm an unbounded number of times without violating the correctness
properties of key regression schemes. This ability is particularly useful because it means that
an implementor need not fix MW to some finite value at implementation or configuration time.
Nevertheless, our security proof in Section 10 suggest that in practice a content publisher should
limit the number of times it invokes wind to some reasonable value. As another motivation for
KR-RSA, we note that if MW is large, then maintaining the publisher states for KR-SHA1 and
KR-AES may require a non-trivial amount of space (if the publisher stores the entire vector stp) or
time (if the publisher re-derives stp during every wind operation).
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Construction 5.3 [KR-RSA.] The key regression scheme KR-RSA = (setup,wind, unwind, keyder)
is defined as follows. Let Krsa be an RSA key generator for some security parameter k and let
m: Z2k → {0, 1}
k denote the standard big-endian encoding of the integers in Z2k to k-bit strings.
Alg. setup
(N, e, d)
$
← Krsa
S
$
← Z∗N
stp← 〈N, e, d, S〉
Return stp
Alg. wind(stp)
Parse stp as 〈N, e, d, S〉
S′ ← Sd mod N
stp′ ← 〈N, e, d, S′〉
stm← 〈N, e, S〉
Return (stp′, stm)
Alg. unwind(stm)
Parse stm as 〈N, e, S〉
S′ ← Se mod N ; stm′ ← 〈N, e, S′〉
Return stm′
Alg. keyder(stm)
Parse stm as 〈N, e, S〉 ; K ← SHA1(m(S))
Return K
The derived key space for KR-RSA is DK = {0, 1}160. In our experiments, we set k = 1024, and
Krsa returns e = 3 as the RSA public exponent.
The proof of security for KR-RSA is in Section 10. The proof is in the random oracle model and
assumes that the RSA key generator is one-way; we define one-wayness in Section 10.
5.4 Discussion
Alternate constructions. Besides KR-SHA1, KR-AES, and KR-RSA, there are numerous possible
ways to build key regression schemes, some of which are simple variants of the more general con-
structions that we present in subsequent sections (KR-FSPRG, KR-PRG, KR-RO, and KR-RSA-RO).
Using advanced tree-based schemes [4, 6, 37, 39], a publisher could give access to any contiguous
sequence of keys using only a logarithmic number of nodes from a key tree. We do not consider key
trees here because one of our primary design goals is to minimize the size of the member states that
the content publisher must transmit to members. For instance, it is desirable to have constant-sized
metadata in file systems.
On the use of SHA1. We completed the bulk of our research prior to Wang, Yin, and Yu [52]
showing how to find collisions in SHA1 faster than brute force. The result of Wang, Yin, and Yu
raises the question of whether one should continue to use SHA1 in real constructions, including
KR-SHA1 and KR-RSA. This concern is well justified, particularly because other researchers [32,
34] have shown how to extend certain types of collision-finding attacks against hash functions to
break cryptosystems that, at first glance, appear to depend only on a weaker property of the
underlying hash function (like second-preimage resistance) and therefore initially appear to be
immune to collision-finding attacks. Still, we currently suspect that our constructions will resist
immediate extensions to collision-finding attacks against SHA1, particularly because the content
publisher is the entity responsible for determining the inputs to SHA1 and, under our model,
the content publisher would not wish to intentionally compromise the pseudorandomness of its
keys. Alternatively, one could replace the use of SHA1 in our constructions with another hash
function, perhaps a hash function that behaves like a random oracle assuming that the underlying
compression function is a random oracle [16].
6 Key regression from FSPRGs
Toward proving the security of KR-AES, we first show how to construct a key regression scheme from
a forward-secure pseudorandom bit generator (FSPRG) [11]. We call our construction KR-FSPRG;
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see Construction 6.1. Since there are multiple possible ways to instantiate KR-FSPRG, we believe
that KR-FSPRG may be of independent interest. Moreover, our result in this section suggests that
future work in forward-secure pseudorandom bit generators could have useful applications to key
regression schemes.
6.1 Forward-secure pseudorandom generators
Bellare and Yee [11] define stateful pseudorandom bit generators and describe what it means for a
stateful pseudorandom bit generator to be forward-secure. Intuitively a stateful PRG is forward-
secure if even adversaries that are given the generator’s current state cannot distinguish previous
outputs from random.
Syntax. A stateful PRG consists of two algorithms: SBG = (seed, next). The randomized setup
algorithm returns an initial state; we write this as stg
$
← seed. The deterministic next step algorithm
takes a state as input and returns a new state and an output from OutSpSBG, or the pair (⊥,⊥);
we write this as (stg′,K) ← next(stg). We require that the set OutSpSBG is efficiently samplable.
MaxLenSBG ∈ {1, 2, . . .}∪{∞} denotes the maximum number of output blocks that SBG is designed
to produce from a correctness (not security) perspective.
Correctness. The correctness requirement for stateful PRGs is as follows: let stg0
$
← seed and, for
i = 1, 2, . . ., let (stgi,Ki)
$
← next(stgi−1). We require that for i ≤ MaxLenSBG, (stgi,Ki) 6= (⊥,⊥).
Security. Let SBG = (seed, next) be a stateful bit generator. Let A be an adversary. Consider
the experiments Expfsprg-bSBG,A, b ∈ {0, 1}, and the oracles NextOb below. The adversary runs in two
stages: find and guess.
Experiment Expfsprg-bSBG,A
stg
$
← seed
st
$
← ANextOb(find)
b′
$
← A(guess, stg, st)
Return b′
Oracle NextOb
(stg,K)← next(stg)
If b = 0 then K
$
← OutSpSBG
Return K
The FSPRG-advantage of A in breaking the security of SBG is defined as
AdvfsprgSBG,A = Pr
[
Expfsprg-1SBG,A = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expfsprg-0SBG,A = 1
]
.
Under the concrete security approach, the scheme SBG is said to be FSPRG-secure if the FSPRG-
advantage of all adversaries A using reasonable resources is “small.”
6.2 An FSPRG-based key regression scheme
We define KR-FSPRG in Construction 6.1 below. At a high level, one can view KR-FSPRG’s setup
algorithm as running the FSPRG SBG backward, meaning setup runs seed and the output of seed
becomes KR-FSPRG’s MW-th member state. From the MW-th member state, setup invokes next
to obtain the (MW − 1)-st member state; setup continues in this manner until deriving the 1-st
member state. The setup algorithm then outputs a content publisher state stp consisting of an
index i, initially 1, and the MW member states. The wind algorithm, on input a publisher state stp
with index i ≤ MW, outputs the i-th member state in the vector and outputs a revised publisher
state stp′ with index i + 1. On input a member state stm, the wind and keyder algorithms both
invoke next on stm to obtain a pair (stm′,K); wind then outputs the revised member state stm′
whereas keyder outputs the key K.
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Construction 6.1 [KR-FSPRG.] Given a stateful generator SBG = (seed, next), we can construct
a key regression scheme KR-FSPRG = (setup,wind, unwind, keyder) as follows. MW ≤ MaxLenSBG is
a positive integer and a parameter of the construction.
Alg. setup
stgMW
$
← seed
For i = MW downto 2 do
(stgi−1,Ki−1)← next(stgi)
stp← 〈1, stg1, . . . , stgMW〉
Return stp
Alg. wind(stp)
If stp = ⊥ then
return (⊥,⊥)
Parse stp as
〈i, stg1, . . . , stgMW〉
If i > MW return (⊥,⊥)
stp′ ←
〈i+ 1, stg1, . . . , stgMW〉
Return (stp′, stgi)
Alg. unwind(stm)
(stm′,K)← next(stm)
Return stm′
Alg. keyder(stm)
(stm′,K)← next(stm)
Return K
The derived key space for KR-FSPRG is DK = OutSpSBG .
In order for setup and wind to be “efficient,” we assume that MW has some “reasonable” value like
220; in the asymptotic setting we would require that MW be polynomial in some security parameter.
Security. The theorem below states that if SBG is a secure forward-secure pseudorandom bit
generator (i.e., is FSPRG-secure), then the resulting key regression scheme KR-FSPRG built from
SBG via Construction 6.1 will be secure (i.e., KR-secure). Specifically, Theorem 6.2 says that given
an adversary A against KR-FSPRG, one can construct an adversary B against SBG such that B uses
reasonable resources (if A does and if MW is small) and Equation (1) in the theorem statement
holds; q is the minimum of MW and the maximum number of wind and key derivation oracle
queries that A makes. These properties imply security for KR-FSPRG since, if SBG is FSPRG-
secure and if A uses reasonable resources, then AdvfsprgSBG,B and q must both be small, which means
that AdvkrKR,A, the advantage of A in attacking KR-FSPRG, must be small as well.
Theorem 6.2 If SBG is FSPRG-secure, then KR built from SBG via KR-FSPRG (Construction 6.1)
is KR-secure. Concretely, given an adversary A attacking KR, we can construct an adversary B
attacking SBG such that
AdvkrKR,A ≤ (q + 1) ·Adv
fsprg
SBG,B (1)
where q is the minimum of MW and the maximum number of wind and key derivation oracle queries
that A makes. Adversary B makes up to MW queries to its oracle and uses within a small constant
factor of the other resources of A plus the time to run the setup algorithm.
Intuitively, Theorem 6.2 follows from the fact that KR-FSPRG runs SBG backward, which means
that if an adversary A against KR-FSPRG in possession of the first i member states can distinguish
a key Kl, l > i, from random, then an adversary B against SBG in possession of the (MW − i)-th
state output of next could distinguish the (MW− l)-th key output of next from random. The actual
proof involves B guessing the number of WindO oracle queries that A will make. Details below.
Proof of Theorem 6.2: The adversary B is shown in Figure 4. The main idea is that if B
correctly guesses the number of WindO queries that A will make, then B’s simulation is perfect for
either choice of bit b. If B does not correctly guess the number of WindO oracle queries, then it
always returns 0, regardless of the value of the bit b. We restrict q to the minimum of MW and the
maximum number of wind and key derivation oracle queries that A makes since wind is defined to
return (⊥,⊥) after MW invocations.
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Adversary BNextOb(find)
q′
$
← {0, 1, . . . , q}
For i = MW downto q′ + 1 do
Ki−1 ← NextOb
Return 〈q′,Kq′ , . . . ,KMW−1〉
Adversary B(guess, stg, st)
Parse st as 〈q′,Kq′ , . . . ,KMW−1〉
stgq′ ← stg
For i = q′ downto 2 do
(stgi−1,Ki−1)← next(stgi)
i← 0
bad← false
stA
$
← ASimWindO(member)
If i 6= q′ then bad← true
If bad = true then return 0
b′
$
← ASimKeyderO(non-member, stA)
Return b′
Oracle SimWindO
If i ≥ q′ then bad← true
If i ≥ MW or bad = true
then return ⊥
Else i← i+ 1
return stgi
Oracle SimKeyderO
If i ≥ MW then return ⊥
i← i+ 1
Return Ki−1
Figure 4: The adversary B in the proof of Theorem 6.2.
Formally, we claim that
Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,A = 1
]
= (q + 1) · Pr
[
Expfsprg-1SBG,B = 1
]
(2)
Pr
[
Expkr-0KR,A = 1
]
= (q + 1) · Pr
[
Expfsprg-0SBG,A = 1
]
, (3)
from which it follows that
AdvkrKR,A = Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,A = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expkr-0KR,A = 1
]
= (q + 1) ·
(
Pr
[
Expfsprg-1SBG,B = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expfsprg-0SBG,A = 1
])
≤ (q + 1) ·AdvfsprgSBG,B
as desired.
It remains to justify Equation (2), Equation (3), and the resources of B. Let E1 and E0 respectively
denote the events that B sets bad to true in the experiments Expfsprg-1SBG,B and Exp
fsprg-0
SBG,A, i.e., when
B fails to correctly guess the number of wind oracle queries that A makes. Let Pr1 [ · ] and Pr0 [ · ]
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respectively denote probabilities over Expfsprg-1SBG,B and Exp
fsprg-0
SBG,A. We now claim that
Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,A = 1
]
= Pr
[
Expfsprg-1SBG,B = 1 | E1
]
(4)
= Pr
[
Expfsprg-1SBG,B = 1 ∧ E1
]
·
1
Pr1
[
E1
] (5)
= (q + 1) · Pr
[
Expfsprg-1SBG,B = 1 ∧ E1
]
(6)
= (q + 1) ·
(
Pr
[
Expfsprg-1SBG,B = 1 ∧ E1
]
+ Pr
[
Expfsprg-1SBG,B = 1 ∧ E1
])
(7)
= (q + 1) · Pr
[
Expfsprg-1SBG,B = 1
]
.
Equation (4) is true because when the event E1 does not occur, i.e., when B correctly guesses the
number of wind oracle queries that A will make, then B in Expfsprg-1SBG,B runs A exactly as A would
be run in Expkr-1KR,A. Equation (5) follows from conditioning off Pr1
[
E1
]
and Equation (6) is true
because B chooses q′ from q + 1 possible values and therefore Pr1
[
E1
]
= 1/(q + 1). To justify
Equation (7), note that Pr
[
Expfsprg-1SBG,B = 1 ∧ E1
]
= 0 since B always returns 0 whenever it fails to
correctly guess the number of wind oracle queries that A will make. This justifies Equation (2).
To justify Equation (3), note that
Pr
[
Expkr-0KR,A = 1
]
= Pr
[
Expfsprg-0SBG,B = 1 | E0
]
since when the event E0 does not occur, B in Exp
fsprg-0
SBG,B runs A exactly as A would be run
in Expkr-0KR,A. The remaining justification for Equation (3) is analogous to our justification of
Equation (2) above.
The resources for B is within a small constant factor of the resources for A except that B must
execute the setup algorithm itself, which involves querying its oracle up to MW times.
7 Key regression from standard PRGs
We proceed by showing how to build secure key regression schemes from standard (not forward-
secure) pseudorandom bit generators; we call our PRG-based construction KR-PRG. Our approach
capitalizes on a method from Bellare and Yee [11] for building FSPRGs from standard PRGs; we
recall the Bellare-Yee method in Section 7.1. As with KR-FSPRG from Section 6, we believe that
KR-PRG will be of independent interest.
7.1 FSPRGs from pseudorandom bit generators
Pseudorandom bit generators. A pseudorandom bit generator (PRG) [11, 12, 54] is a function
G: {0, 1}k → {0, 1}k+l that takes as input a k-bit seed and returns a string that is longer than the
seed by l bits, k, l ≥ 1. The standard security notion for a PRG is as follows. If A is an adversary,
we let
AdvprgF,A = Pr
[
K
$
← {0, 1}k ; x← G(K) : A(x) = 1
]
− Pr
[
x
$
← {0, 1}k+l : A(x) = 1
]
denote the PRG-advantage of A in attacking G. Under the concrete security approach, G is said to
be a “secure PRG” if the PRG-advantage of all adversaries A using reasonable resources is “small.”
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A PRG-based FSPRG. Bellare and Yee [11] show how to construct an FSPRG from a standard
PRG. We dub their scheme FSPRG-PRG and recall it in Construction 7.1 below. The FSPRG-PRG’s
seed algorithm selects a random k-bit initial seed. The next algorithm, on input a k-bit string stg,
computes the (k + l)-bit string G(stg) and outputs the first k bits of G(stg) as the next state and
the remaining l bits as the key.
Construction 7.1 [FSPRG-PRG, Construction 2.2 of [11].] Given a PRG G : {0, 1}k →
{0, 1}k+l we can construct a FSPRG SBG = (seed, next) as shown below
Alg. seed
stg0
$
← {0, 1}k
return stg0
Alg. next(stgi)
r
$
← G(stgi)
stgi+1 ← first k bits of r
K ← last l bits of r
return (stgi+1,K)
The output space of SBG is OutSpSBG = {0, 1}
l and MaxLenSBG =∞.
The following lemma comes from Bellare and Yee [11] except that we treat q as a parameter of
the adversary and we allow the trivial case that q = 0. Lemma 7.2 states that if G is a secure
PRG, then the stateful bit generator FSPRG-PRG built from G via Construction 7.1 will also be
secure. Specifically, if G is a secure PRG, then AdvprgG,B must be small for all adversaries B using
reasonable resources. Further, if an adversary A against FSPRG-PRG uses reasonable resources,
then the number of oracle queries q that it makes must also be small and B must also use reasonable
resources. These properties, coupled with Equation (8), means that the advantage of all adversaries
A against FSPRG-PRG that use reasonable resources must be small; i.e., FSPRG-PRG must be
FSPRG-secure.
Lemma 7.2 [Theorem 2.3 of [11].] Let G : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}k+l be a PRG, and let SBG be the
FSPRG built using G according to Construction 7.1. Given an adversary A attacking SBG that
makes at most q queries to its oracle, we can construct an adversary B such that
AdvfsprgSBG,A ≤ 2q ·Adv
prg
G,B (8)
where B uses within a small constant factor of the resources of adversary A and computes G up to
q times.
7.2 A PRG-based key regression scheme
Combining KR-FSPRG and FSPRG-PRG in the natural way yields a key regression scheme that we
call KR-PRG. For concreteness we describe KR-PRG in detail below.
Construction 7.3 [KR-PRG.] Let G: {0, 1}k → {0, 1}k+l be a pseudorandom bit generator. We
can construct a key regression scheme KR-PRG = (setup,wind, unwind, keyder) from G as follows.
MW is a positive integer and a parameter of the construction.
Alg. setup
stmMW
$
← {0, 1}k
For i = MW downto 2 do
stmi−1 ← unwind(stmi)
stp← 〈1, stm1, . . . , stmMW〉
Return stp
Alg. wind(stp)
If stp = ⊥ then return (⊥,⊥)
Parse stp as
〈i, stm1, . . . , stmMW〉
If i > MW return (⊥,⊥)
stp′ ← 〈i+ 1, stm1, . . . , stmMW〉
Return (stp′, stmi)
Alg. unwind(stm)
x← G(stm)
stm′ ← first k bits of x
Return stm′
Alg. keyder(stm)
x← G(stm)
K ← last l bits of x
Return K
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The derived key space for KR-PRG is DK = {0, 1}l.
In order for setup and wind to be “efficient,” we assume that MW has some “reasonable” value like
220; in the asymptotic setting we would require that MW be polynomial in some security parameter.
Security. The theorem below states that if G is a secure PRG, then the resulting key regression
scheme KR-PRG built from G via Construction 7.3 will be KR-secure. Specifically, Theorem 7.4
says that given an adversary A against KR-PRG that uses reasonable resources, and assuming that
MW is small, one can construct an adversary B against G such that B uses reasonable resources
and Equation (9) in the theorem statement holds; q is the minimum of MW and the maximum
number of wind and key derivation oracle queries that A makes. These properties imply security
for KR-PRG since, if G is PRG-secure and since A uses reasonable resources, AdvprgG,B and q must
both be small, which means that AdvkrKR,A, the advantage of A in attacking KR-PRG, must be
small as well.
Theorem 7.4 If G: {0, 1}k → {0, 1}k+l is a secure PRG, then the key regression scheme KR built
from G via KR-PRG (Construction 7.3) is KR-secure. Concretely, given an adversary A attacking
KR, we can construct an adversary B attacking G such that
AdvkrKR,A ≤ 2 · (q + 1)
2 ·AdvprgG,B (9)
where q is the minimum of MW and the maximum number of queries A makes to its WindO and
KeyderO oracles. Adversary B uses within a small constant factor of the resources of A, plus the
time to compute setup and G MW times.
Proof of Theorem 7.4: Construction 7.3 is exactly Construction 6.1 built from the forward
secure pseudorandom bit generator defined by Construction 7.1. The theorem statement therefore
follows from Theorem 6.2 and Lemma 7.2.
8 The security of KR-AES
Having shown how to construct secure key regression schemes from secure pseudorandom bit
generators (KR-PRG and Construction 7.3), we are now able to prove the security of KR-AES
(Construction 5.2) by observing that KR-AES is exactly KR-PRG with k = l = 128 and with the
PRG G defined as G(X) = AESX(0
128)‖AESX(1
128) for all X ∈ {0, 1}128. Before stating our formal
result for KR-AES, we first recall the standard notion of a pseudorandom permutation [8, 36].
Pseudorandom permutations. Let E: {0, 1}k × {0, 1}l → {0, 1}l be a block cipher and let
Perm(l) denote the set of all permutations on {0, 1}l. If A is an adversary with access to an oracle,
we let
AdvprpE,A = Pr
[
K
$
← {0, 1}k : AEK(·) = 1
]
− Pr
[
g
$
← Perm(l) : Ag(·) = 1
]
denote the PRP-advantage of A in attacking E. Under the concrete security approach, E is said to
be a “secure PRP” if the PRP-advantage of all adversaries A using reasonable resources is “small.”
Instantiating KR-AES from KR-PRG. As noted above, it is straightforward to instantiate KR-AES
from KR-PRG. Numerous other instantiations exist, e.g., to use a block cipher E with k > l,
one might define G as G(X) = EX(α1)‖EX(α2)‖ . . . where α1, α2, . . . are distinct l-bit strings.
Since KR-AES is one of our preferred constructions, we state the following theorem specifically for
KR-AES; it is straightforward to extend our result to other natural instantiations of KR-PRG. The
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security proof for KR-AES is in the standard model and assumes that AES is a secure pseudorandom
permutation.
Theorem 8.1 If AES is a secure PRP, then KR-AES (Construction 5.2) is KR-secure. Concretely,
given an adversary A attacking KR-AES, we can construct an adversary B attacking AES such that
AdvkrKR,A ≤ 2 · (q + 1)
2 ·
(
Advprp
AES,B + 2
−128
)
(10)
where q is the minimum of MW and the maximum number of queries A makes to its WindO and
KeyderO oracles. Adversary B makes 2 oracle queries and uses within a small constant factor of
the resources of A, plus the time to compute setup and AES 2MW times.
We interpret Theorem 8.1 as follows. Suppose A is an adversary against KR-AES that uses rea-
sonable resources, and in particular makes at most a reasonable number of queries q to its wind
and key derivation oracles. Then we can construct an adversary B against AES that also uses
reasonable resources when MW is small. Because of the resource restrictions on B and under the
assumption that AES is a secure PRP, it follows that AdvprpAES,B must be small. If both q and
AdvprpAES,B are small, then by Equation (10) Adv
kr
KR,A must also be small, meaning that KR-AES
must be KR-secure.
As a concrete example of the bound in Theorem 8.1, consider the case where MW and q are
both 220. Then Equation (10) becomes
AdvkrKR,A ≤ 2
42 ·AdvprpAES,B + 2
−86 ,
which means that unless A exploits a property of AES itself, A will not be able to break the
security of KR-AES with probability better than 2−86. Since it is widely believed that AES is
secure, Theorem 8.1 tells us that it is reasonable to assume that KR-AES is secure for reasonable
choices of MW.
To prove Theorem 8.1 we use Theorem 7.4, the relationship between KR-AES and KR-PRG, and
the fact that the function G defined as G(X) = AESX(0
128)‖AESX(1
128), X ∈ {0, 1}128, is a secure
PRG if AES is a secure PRP. Details follow.
Proof of Theorem 8.1: To instantiate KR-AES from Construction 7.3, we set k = l = 128 and,
for any X ∈ {0, 1}128 , we define G as G(X) = AESX(0
128)‖AESX(1
128).
We first claim that, given an adversary B attacking G, we can construct an adversary C attacking
AES such that
AdvprgG,B ≤ Adv
prp
AES,C + 2
−128 (11)
and C makes two oracle queries and uses within a small constant factor of the resources of B.
Theorem 8.1 follows from this claim and Theorem 7.4.
We now justify our claim above. Let Func(l, l) denote the set of all functions from {0, 1}l to {0, 1}l.
Let C be a PRP adversary that runs B with input f(0128)‖f(1128), where f : {0, 1}128 → {0, 1}128
is C’s oracle. Adversary C then returns the same bit that B returns.
Note that
Pr
[
K
$
← {0, 1}128 ; x← G(K) : B(x) = 1
]
= Pr
[
K
$
← {0, 1}128 : CAESK(·) = 1
]
since, when C’s oracle is AESK(·), C runs B with input AESK(0
128)‖AESK(1
128), for a randomly
selected key K, which has the same distribution as G(K) for a randomly selected key K. Addi-
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tionally,
Pr
[
x
$
← {0, 1}256 : B(x) = 1
]
= Pr
[
g
$
← Func(128, 128) : Cg(·) = 1
]
since, when C’s oracle is a random function from {0, 1}128 to {0, 1}128 , it runs B with a random
256-bit string.
Expanding the definition of AdvprgG,B and substituting the above equalities, we have
AdvprgG,B = Pr
[
K
$
← {0, 1}128 ; x← G(K) : B(x) = 1
]
− Pr
[
x
$
← {0, 1}256 : B(x) = 1
]
= Pr
[
K
$
← {0, 1}128 : CAESK(·) = 1
]
− Pr
[
g
$
← Func(128, 128) : Cg(·) = 1
]
.
If we subtract and add Pr
[
g
$
← Perm(128) : Cg(·) = 1
]
and apply the definition of AdvprpAES,C, we
get
AdvprgG,B = Pr
[
K
$
← {0, 1}128 : CAESK(·) = 1
]
− Pr
[
g
$
← Perm(128) : Cg(·) = 1
]
+Pr
[
g
$
← Perm(128) : Cg(·) = 1
]
− Pr
[
g
$
← Func(128, 128) : Cg(·) = 1
]
= AdvprpAES,C
+Pr
[
g
$
← Perm(128) : Cg(·) = 1
]
− Pr
[
g
$
← Func(128, 128) : Cg(·) = 1
]
.
Using the standard PRF/PRP switching result from [8], re-proven in [10, 48], and the fact that C
makes only two oracle queries, the above simplifies to Equation (11), completing the proof.
9 The security of KR-SHA1
Although we derived KR-SHA1 from the key rotation scheme in Figure 3, we find that one can
also view KR-SHA1 as an instantiation of KR-PRG with k = l = 160 and G defined as G(X) =
SHA1(X)‖SHA1(08‖X) for all X ∈ {0, 1}160. If we view SHA1 as a random oracle, then G is a
secure PRG in the random oracle model, and we can use this observation and Theorem 7.4 to prove
the security of KR-SHA1 in the random oracle model.
Here we give a direct proof of security for KR-SHA1 in order to obtain a tighter bound. The
tightness issue with using KR-PRG and Theorem 7.4 to prove the security of KR-SHA1 rests in the
fact that the advantage of an adversary in attacking G in the random oracle model must be upper
bounded by a function of the number of random oracle queries that the adversary makes, and this
function will percolate through the bound in Theorem 7.4.
In what follows we view SHA1(·) in KR-SHA1’s unwind algorithm and SHA1(08‖·) in KR-SHA1’s
keyder algorithm as two different random oracles. Construction 9.1, KR-RO, makes this generaliza-
tion of KR-SHA1 concrete. We choose not to model SHA1(·) and SHA1(08‖·) as a single random
oracle because we do not wish to restrict our analysis to the case where keyder must prefix its inputs
to the random oracle with the zero byte.
Construction 9.1 [KR-RO.] Let H1: {0, 1}
k → {0, 1}k and H2: {0, 1}
k → {0, 1}l be random
oracles. We can construct a key regression scheme KR-RO = (setup,wind, unwind, keyder) from H1
and H2 as shown below. MW is a positive integer and a parameter of the construction.
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Alg. setupH1,H2
stmMW
$
← {0, 1}k
For i = MW downto 2 do
stmi−1 ← unwind
H1,H2(stmi)
stp← 〈1, stm1, . . . , stmMW〉
Return stp
Alg. windH1,H2(stp)
If stp = ⊥ then return (⊥,⊥)
Parse stp as
〈i, stm1, . . . , stmMW〉
If i > MW return (⊥,⊥)
stp′ ← 〈i+ 1, stm1, . . . , stmMW〉
Return (stp′, stmi)
Alg. unwindH1,H2(stm)
stm′ ← H1(stm)
Return stm′
Alg. keyderH1,H2(stm)
K ← H2(stm)
Return K
The derived key space for KR-RO is DK = {0, 1}l.
In order for setup and wind to be “efficient,” we assume that MW has some “reasonable” value like
220; in the asymptotic setting we would require that MW be polynomial in some security parameter.
The following theorem states that Construction 9.1 is secure in the random oracle model for
adversaries that make a reasonable number of queries to their random oracles.
Theorem 9.2 The key regression scheme in Construction 9.1 is secure in the random oracle model.
Formally, let H1: {0, 1}
k → {0, 1}k and H2: {0, 1}
k → {0, 1}l be random oracles and let KR be the
key regression scheme built from H1,H2 via KR-RO (Construction 9.1). Then for any adversary A
we have that
AdvkrKR,A ≤
(MW)2
2k+1
+
q ·MW
2k −MW− q
, (12)
where q is the maximum number of queries total that adversary A makes to its H1 and H2 random
oracles.
As a concrete example of the bound in Theorem 9.2, consider the case where MW = 220 and an
adversary A makes at most q = 240 queries to its random oracles. Then Equation (12) tells us
that the advantage of A in attacking KR-RO is upper bounded by 2−98. Although SHA1 is not a
random oracle, Theorem 9.2 gives us confidence that KR-SHA1 may provide a reasonable level of
security in practice; see Section 5 for additional discussion.
We prove Theorem 9.2 below, but remark that we could simplify the proof if, instead of defining
KR-RO as in Construction 9.1, we include the indices i in the member states, and hence in the inputs
to H1 and H2. We choose to omit the indices i from the member states in KR-RO because we view
KR-RO and KR-SHA1 as closer to what developers might wish to implement in practice.
Proof of Theorem 9.2: Consider the experiments Expkr-1KR,A and Exp
kr-0
KR,A. Let stm1, stm2, . . . ,
stmMW denote the member states as computed by setup, and let w
′ denote the variable number
of WindO oracle queries that A made in its member stage. Let E1 be the event in Exp
kr-1
KR,A
that w′ ≤ MW − 1 and that A queries either its H1 or H2 random oracles with some string
x ∈ {stmw′+1, . . . , stmMW}. Let E0 be the event in Exp
kr-0
KR,A that w
′ ≤ MW− 1 and that A queries
either its H1 or H2 random oracles with some string x ∈ {stmw′+1, . . . , stmMW}. Let F1 be the
event in Expkr-1KR,A that there exist two distinct indices i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,MW} such that stmi = stmj
and let F0 be the event in Exp
kr-0
KR,A that there exist two distinct indices i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,MW} such
that stmi = stmj .
We claim that
AdvkrKR,A ≤ Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,A = 1 ∧ F1
]
+ Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,A = 1 ∧ E1 ∧ F1
]
, (13)
that
Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,A = 1 ∧ F1
]
≤
(MW)2
2k+1
, (14)
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and that
Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,A = 1 ∧ E1 ∧ F1
]
≤
q ·MW
2k −MW− q
, (15)
from which the inequality in the theorem statement follows.
To justify Equation (13), let Pr1 [ · ] and Pr0 [ · ] denote the probabilities over Exp
kr-1
KR,A andExp
kr-0
KR,A,
respectively. From Definition 4.1, we have
AdvkrKR,A = Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,A = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expkr-0KR,A = 1
]
= Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,A = 1 ∧ F1
]
+ Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,A = 1 ∧ E1 ∧ F1
]
+Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,A = 1 ∧ E1 ∧ F1
]
− Pr
[
Expkr-0KR,A = 1 ∧ F0
]
−Pr
[
Expkr-0KR,A = 1 ∧ E0 ∧ F0
]
− Pr
[
Expkr-0KR,A = 1 ∧ E0 ∧ F0
]
≤ Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,A = 1 ∧ F1
]
+ Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,A = 1 ∧ E1 ∧ F1
]
+Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,A = 1 ∧ E1 ∧ F1
]
− Pr
[
Expkr-0KR,A = 1 ∧ E0 ∧ F0
]
. (16)
By conditioning,
Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,A = 1 ∧ E1 ∧ F1
]
= Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,A = 1 | E1 ∧ F1
]
· Pr1
[
E1 ∧ F1
]
and
Pr
[
Expkr-0KR,A = 1 ∧ E0 ∧ F0
]
= Pr
[
Expkr-0KR,A = 1 | E0 ∧ F0
]
· Pr0
[
E0 ∧ F0
]
.
Prior to the adversary causing the events E1∨F1 and E0∨F0 to occur in their respective experiments,
A’s view is identical in both experiments, meaning that
Pr1
[
E1 ∧ F1
]
= Pr0
[
E0 ∧ F0
]
.
Similarly, if the events do not occur, then the outcome of Expkr-1KR,A and Exp
kr-0
KR,A will be the same
since the output of a random oracle is random if the input is unknown; i.e., the response to A’s
key derivation oracle query in the non-member stage will be random in both cases and therefore
Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,A = 1 | E1 ∧ F1
]
= Pr
[
Expkr-0KR,A = 1 | E0 ∧ F0
]
.
Consequently,
Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,A = 1 ∧ E1 ∧ F1
]
= Pr
[
Expkr-0KR,A = 1 ∧ E0 ∧ F0
]
.
Combining the above equation with Equation (16) gives Equation (13).
Returning to Equation (14), we first note that
Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,A = 1 ∧ F1
]
≤ Pr1 [F1 ] .
If we consider the event F1, we note that the setup algorithm selects the points stmMW, stmMW−1,
stmMW−2, and so on, uniformly at random from {0, 1}
k until a collision occurs. Since this is exactly
the standard birthday paradox [8], we can upper bound Pr1 [F1 ] as
Pr1 [F1 ] ≤
(MW)2
2k+1
.
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Equation (14) follows.
To justify Equation (15), we begin by noting that
Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,A = 1 ∧ E1 ∧ F1
]
≤ Pr1
[
E1 | F1
]
· Pr1
[
F1
]
≤ Pr1
[
E1 | F1
]
.
Consider the adversary A in Expkr-1KR,A and assume that F1 does not occur. Consider any snapshot
of the entire state of Expkr-1KR,A before A causes E1 to occur, and let q
′ denote the number of H1
and H2 oracle queries that A has made prior to the snapshot being taken. Then the member states
stmw′+1, . . . , stmMW are restricted only in that they are distinct strings from {0, 1}
k and that none
of the strings are from {stm1, . . . , stmw′} or the set of A’s q
′ queries to its random oracles; i.e., the
member states that A obtained in its member stage and the responses from the KeyderO oracle do
not reveal additional information to the adversary. This means that if the adversary’s next oracle
query after this snapshot is to one of its random oracles, and if that input for that oracle query is
some string x, then the probability that x ∈ {stmw′+1, . . . , stmMW}, i.e., the probability that A’s
oracle query would cause E1 to occur, is at most (MW−w
′)/(2k− (w′+ q′)) ≤ MW/(2k−MW− q′).
Summing over all of A’s q random oracle queries and taking an upper bound, we have
Pr1
[
E1 | F1
]
≤
q ·MW
2k −MW− q
,
which completes the proof.
We remark that in addition to viewing KR-SHA1 as an instantiation of KR-PRG, one could view
KR-AES as an instantiation of KR-RO with k = l = 128 and, for all X ∈ {0, 1}128, with H1(X)
defined as AESX(0
128) and H2(X) defined as AESX(1
128); Diffie and Hellman suggest using a block
cipher as a hash function in this manner in [17]. We choose to prove the security of KR-AES directly
in Section 8, rather than instantiate KR-RO, because we desire a proof of security for KR-AES in
the standard model.
10 The security of KR-RSA
In our proof of security for KR-RSA we view the use of SHA1 in keyder as a random oracle.
Construction 10.1, KR-RSA-RO, makes this generalization concrete.
Construction 10.1 [KR-RSA-RO.] Given an RSA key generator Krsa for some security parameter
k and a random oracle H: Z2k → {0, 1}
l, we can construct a key regression scheme KR-RSA-RO =
(setup,wind, unwind, keyder) as shown below, where MW =∞.
Alg. setupH
(N, e, d)
$
← Krsa
S
$
← Z∗N
stp← 〈N, e, d, S〉
Return stp
Alg. windH(stp)
Parse stp as 〈N, e, d, S〉
S′ ← Sd mod N
stp′ ← 〈N, e, d, S′〉
stm← 〈N, e, S〉
Return (stp′, stm)
Alg. unwindH(stm)
Parse stm as 〈N, e, S〉
S′ ← Se mod N
stm′ ← 〈N, e, S′〉
Return stm′
Alg. keyderH(stm)
Parse stm as 〈N, e, S〉
K ← H(S)
Return K
The derived key space for KR-RSA-RO is DK = {0, 1}l.
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Toward proving KR-RSA secure, we first prove in Section 10.1 that KR-RSA-RO is KR-secure against
adversaries that use reasonable resources and that make at most one KeyderO oracle query; the
result in Section 10.1 assumes that the RSA key generator Krsa in KR-RSA-RO is one-way. We then
show in Section 10.2 that if a key regression scheme is secure against adversaries restricted to one
KeyderO oracle query, then the key regression scheme is secure against adversaries making multiple
KeyderO oracle queries. In Section 10.3 we combine these two results to show that KR-RSA-RO is
secure against adversaries that use reasonable resources but make an otherwise unrestricted number
of KeyderO oracle queries.
Before proceedings with Section 10.1, we first define what it means for an RSA key generator
to be one-way.
Security for RSA key generators. Let Krsa be an RSA key generator with security parameter
k. If A is an adversary, we let
Advrsa-owKrsa,A = Pr
[
(N, e, d)
$
← Krsa ; x
$
← Z∗N ; y ← x
e mod N : A(y, e,N) = x
]
denote the RSA one-way advantage of A in inverting RSA with the key generator Krsa. Under the
concrete security approach, Krsa is said to be a “one-way” if the RSA one-way advantage of all
adversaries A using reasonable resources is “small.”
10.1 Security of KR-RSA under one KeyderO oracle query
Lemma 10.2 below states that if the RSA key generator Krsa is one-way, then the resulting con-
struction KR-RSA-RO is secure against adversaries that use reasonable resources and that make at
most one KeyderO oracle query.
Lemma 10.2 If Krsa is an RSA key generator with security parameter k, then the key regression
scheme KR built from Krsa via KR-RSA-RO (Construction 10.1) is KR-secure in the random oracle
model against adversaries restricted to one KeyderO oracle query assuming that Krsa is one-way.
Concretely, given an adversary A attacking KR that makes at most one key derivation oracle query,
we can construct an adversary B attacking Krsa such that
AdvkrKR,A ≤ (q + 1) ·Adv
rsa-ow
Krsa,B , (17)
where q is the maximum number of winding oracle queries that A makes. Adversary B uses within
a small constant factor of the resources as A plus performs up to q RSA encryption operations.
To prove Lemma 10.2 we observe that in order for an adversary A in possession of the i-th member
state 〈N, e, Si〉 to distinguish the (i+1)-st key from random, the adversary must query its random
oracle with Si+1, where 〈N, e, Si+1〉 is the (i+1)-st member state. Since Si = S
e
i+1 mod N , querying
the random oracle with Si+1 amounts to inverting Si. The actual proof of Lemma 10.2 involves B
guessing the number of WindO oracle queries that A makes. Details follow.
Proof of Lemma 10.2: Consider the experimentsExpkr-1KR,A andExp
kr-0
KR,A; let (N, e, S1), (N, e, S2),
. . . , (N, e, Sw′) denote the responses to A’s wind oracle queries when A is in the member stage,
w′ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , q}. Let E1 and E0 respectively be the events in Exp
kr-1
KR,A and Exp
kr-0
KR,A that A
queries its random oracle with a value S such that Se ≡ Sw′ mod N . We claim that
AdvkrKR,A = Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,A = 1 ∧ E1
]
− Pr
[
Expkr-0KR,A = 1 ∧ E0
]
. (18)
Consider now the adversary B in Figure 5. We additionally claim that
Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,A = 1 ∧ E1
]
≤ (q + 1) · Pr
[
Exprsa-owKrsa,B = 1
]
. (19)
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Adversary B(y, e,N)
bad← false
α← ⊥
j ← 0
w
$
← {0, 1, 2, . . . , q}
stmw ← y
For i = w − 1 downto 1 do
stmi ← (stmi+1)
e mod N
st
$
← ASimWindO,SimH(member)
If j 6= w then
bad← true
Return ⊥
b
$
← ASimKeyderO,SimH(non-member, st)
Return α
Oracle SimWindO
j ← j + 1
If j ≤ w then return stmj
Else return ⊥
Oracle SimKeyderO
K
$
← DK
Return K
Oracle SimH(x)
If xe = y mod n then α← x
If H[x] undefined then
H[x]
$
← DK
Return H[x]
Figure 5: The adversary B in the proof of Lemma 10.2.
Combining these two equations and the definition of security for Krsa gives Equation (17).
It remains to justify Equation (18), Equation (19), and the resource requirements for B. We first
justify Equation (18). Let Pr1 [ · ] and Pr0 [ · ] denote the probabilities over Exp
kr-1
KR,A and Exp
kr-0
KR,A,
respectively. From Definition 4.1, we have
AdvkrKR,A = Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,A = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expkr-0KR,A = 1
]
= Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,A = 1 ∧ E1
]
+Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,A = 1 ∧ E1
]
−Pr
[
Expkr-0KR,A = 1 ∧ E0
]
− Pr
[
Expkr-0KR,A = 1 ∧ E0
]
. (20)
By conditioning,
Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,A = 1 ∧ E1
]
= Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,A = 1 | E1
]
· Pr1
[
E1
]
and
Pr
[
Expkr-0KR,A = 1 ∧ E0
]
= Pr
[
Expkr-0KR,A = 1 | E0
]
· Pr0
[
E0
]
.
Prior to E1 and E0, A’s view is identical in both experiments, meaning that
Pr1
[
E1
]
= Pr0
[
E0
]
.
Further, if the events do not occur, then the outcome of Expkr-1KR,A and Exp
kr-0
KR,A will be the same
since the output of a random oracle is random if the input is unknown; i.e., the response to A’s
key derivation oracle query in the non-member stage will be random in both cases and therefore
Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,A = 1 | E1
]
= Pr
[
Expkr-0KR,A = 1 | E0
]
.
Consequently,
Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,A = 1 ∧ E1
]
= Pr
[
Expkr-0KR,A = 1 ∧ E0
]
.
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Combining the above equation with Equation (20) gives Equation (18).
We now turn to Equation (19). Note that B runs A exactly as in Expkr-1KR,A assuming that B
correctly guesses the number of wind oracle queries that A will make in its member stage; i.e., if B
does not set bad to true. Here we use the fact that RSA encryption and decryption is a permutation
and therefore B is justified in unwinding a starting state from its input (y, e,N). Also observe that
if E1 in Exp
kr-1
KR,A occurs and if B does not set bad to true, then B will succeed in inverting RSA.
Letting BAD denote the event that B sets bad to true, it follows that
Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,A = 1 ∧ E1
]
≤ Pr
[
Exprsa-owKrsa,B = 1 | BAD
]
and, by conditioning, that
Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,A = 1 ∧ E1
]
≤ Pr
[
Exprsa-owKrsa,B = 1 ∧ BAD
]
·
1
Pr2
[
BAD
]
where Pr2 [ · ] denotes the probability over Exp
rsa-ow
Krsa,B
. Equation (19) follows from the above equation
and the fact that Pr2
[
BAD
]
= 1/(q + 1).
Turning to the resource requirements of B, note that the for loop in B is not present A (nor in
the algorithm setup nor the experiment Expkr-bKR,A). This means that B may perform q more RSA
encryption operations than in the Expkr-bKR,A experiment running A; B does not, however, invoke
any RSA decryption operations.
10.2 Security under one KeyderO oracle query implies security under many
The following lemma states that if a key regression scheme is secure against adversaries restricted
to one KeyderO oracle query, then the key regression scheme is secure against adversaries allowed
multiple KeyderO oracle queries.
Lemma 10.3 If a key regression scheme is secure when an adversary is limited to one KeyderO
oracle query, then the key regression scheme is secure when an adversary is allowed multiple KeyderO
oracle queries. Concretely, let KR be a key regression scheme. Given an adversary A attacking KR
that makes at most q1 queries to WindO and q2 queries to KeyderO, we can construct an adversary
B attacking KR such that
AdvkrKR,A ≤ q2 ·Adv
kr
KR,B , (21)
B makes at most q1 + q2 − 1 queries to WindO (or 0 queries if q1 + q2 = 0), B makes at most
one query to KeyderO, and B has other resource requirements within a small constant factor of the
resource requirements of A.
Proof of Lemma 10.3: We consider the case where q2 = 0 separately. If q2 = 0 then
Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,A = 1
]
= Pr
[
Expkr-0KR,A = 1
]
since the adversary A’s view in the experiments Expkr-1KR,A and Exp
kr-0
KR,A is identical. Therefore,
when q2 = 0,
AdvkrKR,A = Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,A = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expkr-0KR,A = 1
]
= 0
= q2 ·Adv
kr
KR,B
27
Experiment ExpHKR,A,i
Pick random oracle H
l← 0
stp
$
← setupH
st
$
← AHWindO,H(member)
j ← 0
b′
$
←
AHKeyderOi,H(non-member, st)
Return b′
Oracle HWindO
l ← l + 1
If l > MW then
return ⊥
(stp, stm)
$
← windH(stp)
Return stm
Oracle HKeyderOi
l ← l + 1
If l > MW then
return ⊥
(stp, stm)
$
← windH(stp)
If j < i then
K ← keyderH(stm)
Else
K
$
← DK
j ← j + 1
Return K
Figure 6: Hybrid experiments for the proof of Lemma 10.3.
for all adversaries B.
We now restrict our analysis to the case where q2 ≥ 1. Consider the experiments ExpHKR,A,i in
Figure 6, i ∈ {0, . . . , q2}. When i = q2, ExpHKR,A,i uses keyder to reply to all of A’s HKeyderO
oracle queries, which means that
Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,A = 1
]
= Pr
[
ExpHKR,A,q2 = 1
]
.
On the other hand, when i = 0, ExpHKR,A,i replies to all of A’s HKeyderO oracle queries with
random values from DK, which means that
Pr
[
Expkr-0KR,A = 1
]
= Pr
[
ExpHKR,A,0 = 1
]
.
From these two equations we conclude that
AdvkrKR,A = Pr
[
ExpHKR,A,q2 = 1
]
− Pr
[
ExpHKR,A,0 = 1
]
. (22)
Consider now the adversary B in Figure 7. We claim that
Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,B = 1
]
=
1
q2
·
q2−1∑
i=0
Pr
[
ExpHKR,A,i+1 = 1
]
(23)
and
Pr
[
Expkr-0KR,B = 1
]
=
1
q2
·
q2−1∑
i=0
Pr
[
ExpHKR,A,i = 1
]
. (24)
Subtracting Equation (24) from Equation (23) and using Definition 4.1, we get
AdvkrKR,B = Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,B = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expkr-0KR,B = 1
]
=
1
q2
·
(
Pr
[
ExpHKR,A,q2 = 1
]
− Pr
[
ExpHKR,A,0 = 1
])
. (25)
Equation (21) follows from combining Equation (22) with Equation (25).
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Adversary BWindO,H(member)
i
$
← {0, . . . , q2 − 1}
l← 0
Run AWindO
′,H′(member),
replying to A’s oracle queries as follows:
For each query to WindO′ do
stm
$
←WindO
l ← l + 1
If l > MW then stm← ⊥
Return stm to A
For each query x to H ′ do
y ← H(x)
Return y to A
Until A halts outputting a state st′
For j = 0 to i− 1 do
stm
$
←WindO
Kj ← keyder
H(stm)
st← (st′, i, l,K0, . . . ,Ki−1)
Return st
Adversary BKeyderOb,H(non-member, st)
Parse st as (st′, i, l,K0, . . . ,Ki−1)
j ← 0
Run AKeyderO
′,H′(non-member, st′),
replying to A’s oracle queries as follows:
For each query to KeyderO′ do
If j < i then K ← Kj
Else if j = i then K ← KeyderOb
Else K
$
← DK
j ← j + 1 ; l← l + 1
If l > MW then K
$
← ⊥
Return K to A
For each query x to H ′ do
y ← H(x)
Return y to A
Until A halts outputting a bit b
Return b
Figure 7: Adversary B for the proof of Lemma 10.3. We describe in the body an alternate descrip-
tion with reduced resource requirements.
It remains to justify Equation (23), Equation (24), and the resources of B. To justify Equation (23),
note that in the experiment Expkr-1KR,B, when B picks some value for i, the view of A becomes
equivalent to A’s view in ExpHKR,A,i+1; namely, A’s first i+ 1 queries to its KeyderO oracle will
be computed using keyder, and the remaining KeyderO oracle queries will return random values
from DK. More formally, if I denotes the random variable for the B’s selection for the variable
i ∈ {0, . . . , q2 − 1}, then
Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,B = 1 | I = i
]
= Pr
[
ExpHKR,A,i+1 = 1
]
for each i ∈ {0, . . . , q2 − 1}. Letting Pr1 [ · ] denote the probability over Exp
kr-1
KR,B, we then derive
Equation (23) by conditioning off the choice of i:
Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,B = 1
]
=
q2−1∑
i=0
Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,B = 1 | I = i
]
· Pr1 [ I = i ]
=
1
q2
·
q2−1∑
i=0
Pr
[
Expkr-1KR,B = 1 | I = i
]
=
1
q2
·
q2−1∑
i=0
Pr
[
ExpHKR,A,i+1 = 1
]
The justification for Equation (24) is similar. When B picks some value for i in Expkr-0KR,B, the view
of A in Expkr-0KR,B becomes equivalent to A’s view in ExpHKR,A,i since in both cases the responses
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to A’s first i (not i+1 this time) queries to its KeyderO oracle will be computed using keyder, and
the remaining KeyderO oracle queries will return random values from DK.
We now turn to the resource requirements of B. The pseudocode for B in Figure 7 suggests that
B might invoke WindO and keyder up to q2 times more than A (since the last for loop of B’s
member stage runs for up to q2 interactions even though A may not make that many KeyderO
oracle queries). We describe B this way since we feel that Figure 7 better captures the main idea
behind our proof and what B does. Equivalently, B could split A’s non-member stage between its
(B’s) own member and non-member stages and invoke WindO and keyder only the number of times
that it needs to simulate i of A’s KeyderOb oracle queries. When viewed this way, B uses resources
equivalent, within a constant factor, to the resources of A.
10.3 The security of KR-RSA under multiple KeyderO oracle queries
From Lemma 10.2 and Lemma 10.3 it follows that KR-RSA-RO is secure in the random oracle
model assuming that Krsa is one-way, even for adversaries allowed multiple KeyderO oracle queries.
Theorem 10.4 makes this reasoning formal. Although SHA1 is not a random oracle, Theorem 10.4
suggests that when instantiated with a suitable RSA key generator, KR-RSA may provide a rea-
sonable level of security in practice; see Section 5 for additional discussion.
Theorem 10.4 If Krsa is an RSA key generator with security parameter k, then KR built from
Krsa via KR-RSA-RO (Construction 10.1) is KR-secure in the random oracle model under the RSA
assumption. Concretely, given an adversary A attacking KR, we can construct an adversary B
attacking Krsa such that
AdvkrKR,A ≤ 2q
2 ·Advrsa-owKrsa,B ,
where q is the maximum number of winding and key derivation oracle queries that A makes. Ad-
versary B uses resources within a constant factor of the resources of A plus the time to perform q
RSA encryption operations.
Proof of Theorem 10.4: The proof of Theorem 10.4 follows from Lemma 10.3 and Lemma 10.2.
Note that for the application of Lemma 10.3 we set q1 = q and q2 = q, meaning the adversary B
from Lemma 10.3 may make up to 2q − 1 queries to its WindO oracle, or 2q if q = 0.
11 Performance of key regression in access-controlled content dis-
tribution
We integrated key regression into the Chefs file system [23] to measure the performance character-
istics of key regression in a real application. We first give an overview of Chefs. Then we provide
measurements to show that key regression enables efficient key distribution even for publishers with
low-bandwidth and high-latency connections such as cable and analog modems.
Chefs for access-controlled content distribution. Chefs [23] is a secure, single-writer, many-
reader file system for access-controlled content distribution using untrusted servers. Chefs extends
the SFS read-only file system [24] to provide access control. Chefs uses lazy revocation [22, 33] and
KR-SHA1 key regression to reduce the amount of out-of-band communication necessary for group
key distribution.
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Three modules comprise the Chefs file system. An untrusted server makes encrypted, integrity-
protected content available in the form of a block store. A publisher creates the encrypted, integrity-
protected content and manages key distribution. A client downloads content from an untrusted
server, then verifies integrity and decrypts the content using keys fetched from the publisher. Our
publisher, e.g., a blogger, is expected to have a low-bandwidth connection.
Several types of keys guard the access control and confidentiality of content in Chefs. Chefs
uses a content key to encrypt content. A member obtains a content key by opening a lockbox that
is encrypted with the group key ; the member derives the group key from the group member state.
After a membership event, e.g., an eviction, the publisher produces a new key regression member
state. The remaining group members request this member state on-demand from the publisher; to
communicate the new member state, the publisher encrypts the member state with each member’s
1 024-bit public RSA key using the low exponent e = 3.
11.1 Hypothesis and methodology
Performance measurements validate that (1) key regression allows a publisher to serve many keys
per second to clients effectively independent of the publisher’s network throughput and the rate
of membership turnover, and (2) key regression does not degrade client latency. To test these
hypotheses, we compare the performance of Chefs to Sous-Chefs, a version of Chefs without key
regression.
Microbenchmarks of Chefs in a static environment ensure confidence that the basic file system
performs in a reasonable manner. The microbenchmarks help to explain the consumption of time
in Chefs. Application-level measurements show that a publisher can serve many keys per second
to clients when using key regression — even on a low-bandwidth connection.
Experimental setup. The client and server contained the same hardware: a 2.8 GHz Intel
Pentium 4 with 512 MB RAM. Each machine used a 100 Mbit/sec full-duplex Intel PRO/1000
Ethernet card and a Maxtor 250 GB, Serial ATA 7 200 RPM hard drive with an 8 MB buffer size,
150 MB/sec transfer rate, and less than 9.0 msec average seek time. The publisher was a 3.06 GHz
Intel Xeon with 2 GB RAM, a Broadcom BCM5704C Dual Gigabit Ethernet card, and a Hitachi
320 GB SCSI-3 hard drive with a 320 MB/sec transfer rate.
The machines were connected on a 100 Mbit/sec local area network and all used FreeBSD 4.9.
NetPipe [49] measured the round-trip latency between the pairs of machines at 249 µsec, and the
maximum sustained TCP throughput of the connection at 88 Mbit/sec when writing data in 4 MB
chunks and using TCP send and receive buffers of size 69 632 KB. When writing in 8 KB chunks
(the block size in Chefs), the peak TCP throughput was 66 Mbit/sec.
The experiments used the dummynet [45] driver in FreeBSD to simulate cable modem and
analog modem network conditions. For the cable modem on the publisher machine, the round-trip
delay was set to 20 msec and the download and upload bandwidth to 4 Mbit/sec and 384 Kbit/sec
respectively. For the analog modem, the round-trip delay was set to 200 msec and the upload and
download bandwidth each to 56 Kbit/sec.
In the Chefs measurements, the inode cache has 16 384 entries, a directory block cache has 512
entries, an indirect block cache has 512 entries, and a file block cache has 64 entries. A large file
block cache is unnecessary because the NFS loopback server performs most of the file data caching.
For each measurement, the median result of five samples are reported. Errors bars in Figure 9
indicate minimum and maximum measurements.
31
Small file Large file Emacs compilation
SFSRO 1.38 sec 8.21 Mbyte/sec 50.78 sec
Chefs 1.52 sec 5.13 Mbyte/sec 51.43 sec
Table 2: Small-file, large-file, and emacs-compilation microbenchmarks of Chefs versus SFSRO, an
integrity-protected but not access-controlled file system. In all tests the server has a warm cache,
and the client has a cold cache.
11.2 Microbenchmarks
To isolate the cost of encryption in Chefs, we disable key regression and compare the performance
of Chefs to SFSRO using I/O-bound workloads. In these workloads, the Chefs client performs a
single key derivation but no unwinding. SFSRO is an integrity-protected, but not access-controlled
file system. Because SFSRO has no access control, there is no encryption. These measurements
can later help to explain where time is spent in application-level benchmarks.
Table 2 analyzes the performance of Chefs with the small-file, large-file, and emacs-compilation
benchmarks described in the SFSRO paper [24]. The small-file benchmark consists of the read
phases of the LFS benchmarks [46] — sequentially reading 1 000 files each 1 Kbyte in size spread
across ten directories. The small-file benchmark helps to understand the performance of a single
client accessing a single server. The large-file benchmark generates a sequential read of a 40 Mbyte
file. Using a warm server cache and cold client cache allows the large-file benchmark to measure
the overhead added to a single client’s throughput. The emacs-compilation benchmark measures
the execution time on a client to compile Emacs. The source code is fetched from a Chefs or
SFSRO server, and the object code is compiled locally on the client. Optimization and debugging
are disabled during the compilation.
The SFSRO and Chefs small-file benchmarks each generate 2 022 RPCs to fetch and decrypt
content from a server (1 000 files, 10 directories, and one root directory — each generating two
RPCs: one for the inode, one for the content). The measurements below show that there is a
performance cost to adding confidentiality in Chefs for I/O-intensive workloads, but that the cost
is not noticeable in application-level benchmarks.
The SFSRO and Chefs small file benchmarks finish in 1.38 seconds and 1.52 seconds respectively.
The small overhead in Chefs comes as a result of decrypting content with 128-bit AES in CBC
mode, downloading a 20-byte key regression member state from the publisher, and decrypting the
member state with 1 024-bit RSA. In this local area network, the network latency accounts for nearly
30% of the overall latency; 2 022 RPCs with a 249 µsec round-trip time yields 503 msec. Content
distribution networks are more commonly found in wide-area networks, where longer round-trip
times would absorb the cost of the cryptography in Chefs.
The large-file benchmark generates 5 124 RPCs to fetch 40 Mbytes of content from the server
(two RPCs for the root directory, two for the file, and 5 120 for the file content). The cost of
cryptography in Chefs comes at a cost of 3.08 MByte/sec in throughput. The Chefs client takes
approximately 32% of the client CPU, whereas the SFSRO client takes only 14% of the CPU.
The software distribution benchmark consists of an Emacs version 21.3 compilation. The source
code is stored in the file system, while the resulting binaries are written to a local disk. The
experiment mounts the remote file system, runs configure, then compiles with make. This CPU-
intensive workload requires access to approximately 300 files. The cost of cryptography is no longer
noticeable. The Chefs client program consumes less than 1% of the CPU while the compiler takes
nearly 90% of the CPU.
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Key regression protocol Winds/sec Unwinds/sec
KR-SHA1 Not applicable 687 720
KR-AES Not applicable 3 303 900
KR-RSA 158 35 236
Table 3: Microbenchmarks of KR-SHA1,KR-AES,KR-RSA key regression.
11.3 Secure content distribution on untrusted storage
A standard benchmark is not available for measuring the effects of group membership dynamics.
Therefore, we evaluate Chefs based on how a client might search for content in a subscription-based
newspaper.
Table 3 displays the performance of basic key regression operations. The internal block size
of the hash function matters significantly for the throughput of KR-SHA1 key regression. Because
SHA1 uses an internal 512-bit block size, hashing values smaller than 512 bits results in poorer
throughput than one would expect from SHA1 hashing longer inputs. For this reason, KR-AES key
regression performs significantly better than KR-SHA1 key regression.
Searching encrypted content. The benchmarks were inspired by the membership dynamics
reported at Salon.com, a subscription-based online journal [47]. Salon announced that in the year
2003, they added 31 000 paid subscribers (for a total of 73 000) and maintained a 71% renewal rate.
Thus, a 29% eviction rate would generate an expected 21 170 evictions in one year. This suggests
that the total number of membership events would reach 52 170.
To represent a workload of searching newspaper content, the experiment tests a file system
containing 10 000 8 KB encrypted files and the associated content keys. The experiment consists
of mounting the file system and reading all the files. This causes the client machine to fetch all the
content keys.
We further motivate our example workload as follows. While there is promising research in
enabling a third party server to search encrypted data [2, 13, 27, 29, 50, 53], current approaches
for searchable encryption do not prevent the server from outputting false negatives. Because Chefs
extends the SFS read-only file system, it inherits the property that the client can verify whether it
has received all intended content (i.e., the whole truth) from the server. Therefore, to avoid false
negatives, we desire a client-based search in which the Chefs client downloads all the encrypted
content and keys to perform the search itself.
Sous-Chefs. To determine the cost of key regression, Chefs is compared to a version of Chefs
with key regression disabled. This strawman file system is called Sous-Chefs. Chefs and Sous-
Chefs differ only in how they fetch group keys from the publisher. When using KR-SHA1 for key
regression, Chefs fetches a 20-byte member state, encrypted in the client’s public 1 024-bit RSA
key with low exponent e = 3. Chefs then uses key regression to unwind and derive all past versions
of the group key. Sous-Chefs fetches all the derived group keys at once (each 16 bytes). The group
keys themselves are encrypted with 128-bit AES in CBC mode. The AES key is encrypted with
the client’s RSA public key. A Sous-Chefs client is allowed to request a single bulk transfer of every
version of a group key to fairly amortize the cost of the transfer.
Reduced throughput requirements. Figure 8 shows that a publisher can serve many more
clients in Chefs than Sous-Chefs in low-bandwidth, high-latency conditions. The CPU utilization
for Chefs under no bandwidth limitation is negligible, indicating that the cost of RSA encryptions
on the publisher is not the bottleneck.
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Figure 8: Aggregate publisher throughput for key distribution plotted on a log-log graph. A
client-session consists of fetching key material sufficient to generate all the keys to decrypt the
published content. Key regression enables a publisher to support many client-sessions per second.
Chefs always performs better than Sous-Chefs because key regression performance is effectively
independent of the rate of membership turnover.
The benchmark measured in Figure 8 effectively simulates the effect of 20 clients applying the
same key distribution workload to the server. After all traces have completed, the effective number
of trace playbacks per second is recorded. Each test runs for 1–2 seconds, asynchronously playing
back 20 traces of a single client fetching the keys for the search workload.
A Chefs trace consists of a TCP connection setup, followed by a getkey RPC. Chefs always
generates a single getkey remote procedure call, regardless of the number of key versions.
A Sous-Chefs trace consists of a TCP connection setup, followed by a read of an encrypted
file containing a set of keys. The file read is further composed of an sfsconnect RPC, a getfsinfo
RPC, a getkey RPC, and a number of getdata RPCs sufficient to download the file of keys. The
Sous-Chefs traces of fetching 1, 10, 102, 103, 104, 105, and 106 keys generate 4, 4, 4, 5, 24, 200, and
1 966 asynchronous RPCs respectively.
Over fast network connections, the cost of transferring the 10 000 8 KB files dominates the
client latency. A new trend appears after 100 transferred keys in the measurements of Sous-Chefs
in Figure 8. The network bandwidth and latency of the publisher begin to dominate the client
latency. For instance, Sous-Chefs running on the simulated cable modem with 100 keys results
in a publisher having 13 client-sessions/sec. This measurement meets the expectations. With
a 384 Kbit/sec upload bandwidth, 20 ms round-trip delay, and the transfer of 100 keys each of
size 16 bytes using 4 RPCs, one would expect a single client to take at least 50 msec simply to
download the keys. This translates to at most 20 client-sessions/sec under perfectly asynchronous
RPC conditions—confirming the measurements as reasonable.
Improved client latency. The client latency experiment measures the time for a single client
to execute the search workload. The untrusted server and publisher have warm caches while the
client has a cold cache.
The log-log chart in Figure 9 shows that Chefs outperforms Sous-Chefs for the search workload
under several network conditions. In Sous-Chefs, the network transfer time dominates client latency
because of the sheer volume of keys transferred from the publisher to the client. There is no
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Figure 9: A log-log chart of single client latency to read 10 000 8 KB encrypted files and the
associated content keys. Key regression maintains a constant client latency regardless of the number
of keys. Under low-bandwidth, high-latency conditions, Sous-Chefs latency is dominated my the
transfer time of keys after reaching 10 000 keys. Key regression enables much better latency in
Chefs.
measurement for Sous-Chefs downloading 1 000 000 keys because the kernel assumes that the mount
failed after waiting 1 000 seconds. On a 56 Kbit/sec network, Sous-Chefs is expected to take over
2 232 seconds to download 1 000 000 keys each 16 bytes. Thus, only three bars appear for the
test cases involving 1 000 000 content keys. Key regression itself is a small component of the Chefs
benchmark. With 106 keys, key regression on the client takes less than 1.5 sec with CPU utilization
never exceeding of 42%.
12 Conclusions
We presented provably-secure constructions for key regression — addressing the shortfalls of key
rotation. We also provided the first measurements of either a key regression or key rotation system.
Finally, we integrated key regression in a content distribution application to demonstrate how key
regression enables efficient key distribution on low-bandwidth, high-latency connections. Using key
regression, a publisher can efficiently control access to content independent of group membership
dynamics and without needing a fast network connection.
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